<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[The Last Stretch]]></title><description><![CDATA[AI and other things that are pivotal for the future.]]></description><link>https://thelaststretch.blog</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 15:46:24 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://thelaststretch.blog/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Alex]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[alexamadori@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[alexamadori@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[alexamadori@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[alexamadori@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Advances in interpretability would boost capabilities more than alignment]]></title><description><![CDATA[If you're currently working on interpretability, please consider stopping.]]></description><link>https://thelaststretch.blog/p/advances-in-interpretability-would</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thelaststretch.blog/p/advances-in-interpretability-would</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:28:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d318bc04-c99e-4488-bc14-df802184a4fd_600x559.webp" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interpretability is considered by many a major bottleneck for alignment. As a result, a lot of people who are concerned about AI safety, and especially about extinction risk and other catastrophic risks, work on interpretability.</p><p>In this post, I want to argue that better interpretability methods would likely speed up capabilities dramatically. Worse, they would speed up capabilities much more than they would speed up alignment. This is true for the current world, and for any world without extremely high levels of coordination and sanity about ASI development.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>Under any worldview where faster capabilities progress makes catastrophe more likely, we should expect progress in interpretability to make the odds of catastrophe much worse.</p><p>To put it briefly, this is because the better we get at interpretability, the more AI will be able to read and optimize its own code. This means that improvements in interpretability would catalyze recursive self-improvement (RSI).</p><p>If you are concerned about AI x-risk, and you work on interpretability because of it, I urge you to think about this and consider stopping.</p><h1>Chess as a toy example of an AI capability</h1><p>As a field, &#8220;interpretability&#8221; is a loose collection of related research agendas rather than something well defined, so I want to pin down what I mean by it.</p><p>In this post, interpretability is anything that helps you understand the internals of models and how they think. I&#8217;m going to use chess as a toy example of a task performed by an AI. The point of this exercise is to show how methods that help to understand how the AI is playing chess would allow one to massively improve AI&#8217;s chess ability, given the same amount of compute and training data.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><p>Specifically, let's think about how a modern general-purpose AI thinks about chess. Just so you know, they are quite decent at it: Opus 5.5 on high thinking <a href="https://chessbench.org/">plays at roughly 2100 Elo</a> (the level of a strong amateur). At this setting, Opus 5.5 thinks for single-digit minutes on average, nowhere near enough to search massive game trees the way specialized chess engines do. So it must be using some good heuristics rather than brute force.</p><p>How does this AI play chess? We can imagine one of the things the AI does internally is use a set of heuristics for judging whether a board position is &#8220;good&#8221; without looking ahead. Any chess playing agent needs this, since you can&#8217;t simulate every game tree to the end.</p><p>One simple such heuristic is simply counting which pieces are on the board. For any hypothetical chess position an AI might evaluate, this heuristic tells it if a side has an advantage because it has more pieces left.</p><p>A slightly more complicated heuristic might be one that simulates certain game-trees a few steps ahead and then passes the result to simpler heuristics such as the pieces-count heuristic. For example, in chess, there are often multi-step &#8220;exchange sequences&#8221; where many pieces are traded. These can be fairly forced, due to a threat being present at every turn in the chain. It is an important chess skill to be able to evaluate the result of these chains, so that you can judge whether to trigger them or avoid them, or even whether to set them up in advance.</p><p>Given that we are talking about general-purpose AIs, there are probably circuits being used that have nothing at all to do with chess. For example, AIs probably have a general sense of when they&#8217;ve spent too long on one approach to a problem, and should look for other approaches instead.</p><p>They might even have ways to judge which domains reward thinking longer, which reward more exploration versus exploitation, and in which domains a brainstorm should be expected to cover every reasonable idea.</p><h1>Interpretability would accelerate capabilities progress dramatically</h1><p>Having set up some examples of &#8220;circuits&#8221; that interpretability might help us decode, let&#8217;s go back to the main question: would better interpretability methods improve our ability to make AIs strong chess players, given the same amount of compute and training data?<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a></p><p>My claim is that any large improvement in interpretability methods, such as one we might hope will help us with alignment research, would enable developers to train AIs much more efficiently, dramatically accelerating capabilities.</p><p>The better interpretability gets, the more neural networks are like code. Weights stop being completely inscrutable, and become more like source code that can be read and modified. Humans and AIs can then directly see and optimize an AI&#8217;s internal algorithms.</p><p>To see why this is meaningful, think about how humans learn chess with much less training data than AIs.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>Imagine you&#8217;re a smart person trying your best to learn chess, but you&#8217;re not allowed to read any chess theory.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> Say that you&#8217;re playing a game and end up in a wildly disadvantageous position, or lose outright. You want to figure out which of your moves was more directly responsible for your loss, so you don&#8217;t play similar moves in the future.</p><p>This is extremely hard, because the hypothesis space is huge. Every move you played could have led to an entirely different game tree. How do you tell which of your moves were significantly worse than the alternatives?</p><p>As a smart person, you can lean on your grasp of concepts like adversariality, optimality, and constrained action spaces. Even if you&#8217;ve never studied them, your intuitions here are much better than those of a randomly initialized neural network.</p><p>For example, winning at chess means leaving your opponent no way to save their king. So upon hearing the rules, you&#8217;ll guess right away that you want to constrain your opponent&#8217;s action space as much as possible.</p><p>Without playing a single game, you&#8217;ll probably guess it&#8217;s better when your opponent has fewer pieces (since it restricts their action space) and you have more (since that gives you more ways to restrict the king&#8217;s movement). With this, you&#8217;ve already generated the most important heuristic for judging advantage in a chess position, and coming up with a heuristic is nearly all the work involved in validating it.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a></p><p>As you play more games, first principles help you quickly arrive at ideas like defending pieces, forcing moves, and forced exchange sequences. Contrast this with a learning algorithm that has a uniform prior over hypotheses and starts with zero domain knowledge. It will need to witness an enormous number of games before it gets any ideas this good.</p><p>Backpropagation is slower because it isn&#8217;t intelligent. It can&#8217;t make flexible use of domain knowledge, and it can&#8217;t make use of first principles of AI design. Humans and general-purpose AIs can, but backpropagation can&#8217;t.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a></p><p>If we could directly read and write AI internals, we could start to intelligently design AI algorithms instead of evolving them with backprop. From this, I expect a massive acceleration in capabilities.</p><p>To be clear, I don&#8217;t expect that humans will start rewriting the code of AIs by hand. It seems likely that even if you simplified AI internals to their irreducible complexity, there would be far too much logic in there for humans to understand and edit directly.</p><p>My expectation is that instead we&#8217;d see a gradual (but fast!) adoption of interpretability methods to speed up AI training in compute-maximalist ways. In practice, AIs would do the massive amounts of grunt work required to read half-interpreted internal circuits, and of judging whether they should be modified, amplified, refactored, purged, or whatever else.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a></p><p>Of course, AI progress is a verifiable field, meaning the AIs can be trained to make better edits that lead to higher performance, and then you get disassembled into paperclips.</p><h1>Outside of the toy example</h1><p>When we move out of the toy example of chess and into more realistic fields, I believe there are even stronger reasons to believe that interpretability methods would accelerate capabilities dramatically.</p><p><strong>Bias and noise.</strong> Real-world rewards can be biased and noisy. Spurious correlations sneak into training data because it gets badly designed. Even unbiased data can be very noisy, in domains where the result of a single episode involves a lot of randomness.</p><p>In these cases, training can take a long time to tell garbage hypotheses about which circuits would be useful from true ones. The more clearly we can understand the circuits, the easier it becomes to recognize ones that are picking up on biases or spurious correlations.</p><p><strong>Distilling reflective knowledge into executive skills.</strong> Good interpretability makes it much easier to distill an AI&#8217;s knowledge into its executive skills. As an example within software engineering, an AI may &#8220;know&#8221; that a certain memory access pattern tends to produce faster software, while still having a tendency to use a different access pattern. Interpretability would make it massively easier to synchronize the AI&#8217;s reflective knowledge with its executed behavior.</p><p><strong>Refactoring and generalization.</strong> You could also massively refactor AIs. Given how they are developed, we should expect that AIs are terrible software. Whatever is the neural network equivalent of spaghetti code full of ad-hoc special cases, we should expect to find that in AI internals.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a></p><p>With better interpretability methods, it becomes possible to refactor this code in ways that greatly simplify it and unify previously fragmented shards of intelligence. In the case of a general-purpose AI, this could be extremely powerful, if there are patterns that are easy to learn in one domain, say systems design, yet can generalize to many others, like manipulating humans.</p><p>Even the smartest humans, whose brains are great at making connections between different subjects, never knew as many subjects in as much depth as today&#8217;s AIs. And when they did make a connection, they couldn&#8217;t instantly update all their thought patterns to reflect it.</p><h1>Interpretability is not the same as alignment</h1><p>I genuinely think that better interpretability methods would help with alignment research, to some degree. Even so, they would raise the odds that we reach world-destroying capabilities before we have the alignment science to prevent catastrophe.</p><p>Interpretability is not the same as alignment. It can help with alignment, if only because it would make static and dynamic analysis of AI behavior much easier. It could give us guarantees like &#8220;the AI will never do X&#8221; or &#8220;we can immediately detect and shut down an AI if it ever does X&#8221;, where X is any logical statement on internal AI algorithms.</p><p>This is not the same as solving alignment, because it is extremely unlikely that the alignment properties we want correspond cleanly to logical statements on internal AI algorithms. For example, we might want the AI to never deceive us, but there is no guarantee that every path of execution that leads AI to deceive us is clearly marked as a &#8220;deception&#8221; concept.</p><p>In fact, AIs are Turing-complete at inference time, so they can reimplement deception from scratch if they have to. It should be clear to any programmer that if you have a Turing machine embedded in your program, there is no known way to prevent your program from ever performing a certain computation, much less with any simple logical statement about the stack trace of the meta-level program.</p><p>You can see symptoms of this in how people present interpretability as a solution to alignment. No one has a plan for what to do, even conditional on getting extremely powerful interpretability methods. People handwave. Handwavy intuition can lend some credibility to the belief that interpretability would <em>be helpful</em>, but not more than that, and alignment is extremely hard.</p><p>On top of all that, we don&#8217;t even know what alignment properties we want to ensure. We have extremely tentative ideas for top-level concepts, like CEV and corrigibility. But as far as I know, nobody has the faintest idea how to break these down into lower-level guarantees, and break those down further, and so on until it reaches any sort of logical predicate you could check on an AI, even if you had powerful interpretability methods.</p><p>As it turns out, it is much easier to figure out ways that interpretability methods can help AIs improve AI capabilities than it is to figure out ways the methods can help humans solve alignment.</p><h1>Interpretability boosts capabilities more than it helps with alignment</h1><p><strong>Capabilities are more verifiable than alignment.</strong> Alignment is not a verifiable field. We don&#8217;t know how to specify it in a way we can measure. Capabilities, in comparison, are much more verifiable. In fact, you can already ask Opus 5.5 for ideas on how to measure improvement along various kinds of AI capabilities, and it will give you good ideas.</p><p>Because capabilities improvements are verifiable, any method that allows AIs to try to improve AI capabilities is extremely dangerous. It being a verifiable domain means that even if the AIs are bad at it at the start, they will occasionally succeed. Even without any interpretability methods, AI has <a href="https://x.com/rikiyatakehi/status/2117313742891327994">already succeeded</a> at improving an AI's performance by directly editing the weights.</p><p>And as long as they occasionally succeed, you can use this success as a reward for RL episodes.</p><p><strong>With interpretability, AIs will become legible to AIs before they become legible to humans.</strong> To help an intelligent agent to understand AI internals, interpretability methods can reduce their massive complexity to something that is more intellectually tractable. But making AIs legible to AIs is much easier than making them legible to humans.</p><p>Imagine we have an interpretability breakthrough so insane that we manage to compress an AI whose weights take up 10TB into 1GB of very arcane Rust code, paired with 1TB of databases the code accesses in fairly constrained ways.</p><p>Representing an AI this way does not automatically make it understandable to humans. Making sense of such a codebase could take us decades, even with AI help. At a minimum, functions and database entries would need to be labeled. Most wouldn&#8217;t correspond to concepts you can describe in a brief English sentence, and they would have complex, unexpected interactions with each other.</p><p>The codebase would be too large for any single human to understand. We&#8217;d need to build hierarchical representations, ways to split understanding of the code across large groups of people, and ways to ensure formal and informal guarantees about code that no one person fully understands. This is the problem faced by humans trying to ensure behavioral properties on AI for alignment purposes.</p><p>An AI trying to improve AI capabilities doesn&#8217;t face this problem. For one thing, AIs are much more &#8220;plastic&#8221;: they care far less than humans about code being nicely labeled, and they&#8217;ll start to understand the patterns simply through lots of exposure.</p><p>What&#8217;s more, an AI engaged in recursive self-improvement isn&#8217;t trying to enforce tight guarantees in the same way that humans would be if we tried to solve alignment. For RSI, it&#8217;s enough that the changes it proposes help more often than they hurt, so that the gains compound over time.</p><p>In the worst-case scenario, where any edit to the AI&#8217;s &#8220;code&#8221; is deployed without testing, all it takes for an AI to recursively self-improve is for it to be able to perform interventions that improve capabilities slightly more often than 50% of the time.</p><p>In a best-case scenario, where benchmarks can reliably measure performance degradations and filter out any bad edit, any non-zero chance of improvement will compound over time.</p><h1>Any exceptions?</h1><p>Are there interpretability research agendas that would help us prepare to solve alignment more than they&#8217;d help build world-ending AI?</p><p>I&#8217;m not an interpretability researcher, and I don&#8217;t keep up with every minor interpretability project. So I can&#8217;t confidently say that every interpretability agenda is bad in this way.</p><p>I can imagine that there could be an agenda that selectively improves our understanding of safety-relevant properties, but I would be surprised. How can you understand safety properties of AIs without increasing your understanding of AI internals in general?</p><h1>When does it make sense to work on interpretability?</h1><p>There are worlds where interpretability research makes sense. They are the worlds where you can be confident that a technique capable of boosting capabilities won&#8217;t be used to do so unless it is very clear that it is safe to do so.</p><p>That takes very strong coordination. There needs to be a mechanism in place to ensure that no one in the world will use an interpretability technique to boost capabilities. We need to make sure that no AI company or research project in the world is able to do so.</p><p>Realistically, only governments can enforce this: you&#8217;d need either state-level infosec to keep knowledge of the method from getting out, or the state&#8217;s coercive power to reliably prevent actors from making use of the method for capabilities. And even then, you&#8217;d need to build ways for governments to trust <em>each other</em> that new interpretability techniques are not being used to boost capabilities.</p><p>In order for interpretability research to make sense, it also takes an extreme level of sanity around ASI research. Whatever mechanism decides whether the technique gets used to improve capabilities must refuse to use it unless it&#8217;s confident doing so is safe.</p><p>As things currently stand it is my view that, as an interpretability researcher, you are helping AI companies to accelerate capabilities and destroy the world. If you&#8217;re currently working on interpretability, please consider stopping.</p><p>If you want interpretability to be safe to work on, please help build the required coordination and sanity instead.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The cognitive algorithms I use in this example may not be exactly how an AI plays chess, hopefully without loss of generality. Although, I did try my best to stick to overdetermined thinking patterns that should really really be in there, considering the AI's chess skill.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Keep in mind that while we can generate training data for chess easily, we cannot do the same for pivotal domains like AI research, so this is a very important question.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Do we actually know this, as plebeians who don&#8217;t get to see the inside of AI companies? In a little test I did, Fable 5.0 knew where I work from memory, without having to look me up. My estimation is that at the time, my name appeared on the internet next to my employer, or other information adjacent to my job, fewer than ~10 times. I&#8217;ll assume humans are still more sample-efficient at learning skills, if not at memorization, since I&#8217;d expect the world to look very different if AI training were already as sample-efficient as humans, even just for computer tasks.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Imagine you're a smart person trying your best to learn chess, but you're not allowed to read any chess theory.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>See <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/MwQRucYo6BZZwjKE7">Einstein's Arrogance</a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>In practice, humans seem to have an innate sense that taking pieces is good, but I don't think that's derived from first principles. It's more likely that this is just an intuitive way for humans to design a game, so the causality is the other way around. I wanted to assume the protagonist here is someone who doesn't have this innate intuition, to show how it might be derived from first principles.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Because we don't fully understand backprop, I'm not confident it makes no use of these principles at all. But it would be surprising if it were as efficient at designing AIs as a full-fledged modern AI can get. We never directly optimized backprop to make good updates, aside from architecture-level tricks that couldn't encode concepts as complex as the ones in my chess example.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>I won't give more detail about how I think this would be implemented. It isn't necessary for the point of this post, and I don't want to help AI companies do it.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>This is my interpretation of the bitter lesson. The bitter lesson says sheer compute beats humans&#8217; ability to hand-design things. It says nothing against good priors helping learning, and they clearly do: humans use good priors to speed up their learning all the time. In the past, we&#8217;ve only seen slow, intelligent humans compete with fast, dumb backprop. Even with all the advantage humans had from their intelligence, backprop could make AIs smart much faster from leveraging orders of magnitude more computation. But we&#8217;ve never seen what happens when an agent like an AI gets to leverage tons of computation AND be smart about how it designs AIs.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>I am reminded of a meme which shows a function named "isEven" implemented by writing a special case for every integer.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The doctrine of the Yes-Self]]></title><description><![CDATA["There is no self", the master said. "no u", I replied.]]></description><link>https://thelaststretch.blog/p/the-doctrine-of-the-yes-self</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thelaststretch.blog/p/the-doctrine-of-the-yes-self</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 18:58:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/0b5a4888-b588-43e8-a748-6d135417dc39_1605x980.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><span>Wanted something for me, so<br>Need a vessel for my self.<br>All the things I want, I know,<br>This body won&#8217;t hold them well.</span></em></p><p><em><span>If &#8220;Not water, but the waves&#8221;,<br>Waves can split and reoccur.<br>Could be, all minds are the same,<br>I still want shit, as it were!</span></em></p><p><em><span>Wants as yet fully unfazed,<br>They are not philosophers.<br>Instinct draws a clumsy shape,<br>I will happily defer.</span></em></p><p style="text-align: center;">.</p><p style="text-align: center;">.</p><p style="text-align: center;">.</p><p style="text-align: center;">.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Last Stretch! Subscribe for more.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[AI Researchers Don't Understand the State]]></title><description><![CDATA[No, your AI company will not be able to take over the government]]></description><link>https://thelaststretch.blog/p/ai-researchers-dont-understand-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thelaststretch.blog/p/ai-researchers-dont-understand-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 17:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/7de75bc7-ab51-4ce9-97a9-40c635e6729b_2314x1116.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span>I&#8217;ve noticed an extremely common mistake among people who think about AI and ASI (also known as superintelligence) for a living. The mistake is to model the future of AI as a game played between AI companies, on a board where governments are part of the scenery.</span></p><p><span>People think of AI companies as being able to steer the course of AI development all the way through the end-game. For example, AI researchers often join certain AI companies because they&#8217;re the &#8220;good guys&#8221;, to help the good guys win the race. Or because they expect that being on the inside will give them influence when it matters.</span></p><p><span>Notice what this implies: at some point the winning company has to perform a </span><a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/w/pivotal-act"><span>pivotal act</span></a><span>. It has to prevent every other actor on Earth from building AI irresponsibly. If this were not the case, who would prevent anyone else from deploying a misaligned AI a month later, and killing everyone anyway?</span></p><p><span>But performing a pivotal act necessarily involves gaining control of all governments on Earth. What makes these people think that governments will let them do that?</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><div class="image-link image2" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png" width="925" height="188" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:188,&quot;width&quot;:925,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:147731,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://alexamadori.substack.com/i/208173461?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0e52856e-e891-4815-a83e-de4ae7f38434_925x538.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!KhZg!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F93853b29-32d9-4fdf-a76e-73ee03909974_925x188.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></div><figcaption class="image-caption"><span>OpenAI employee rooting for AI to disempower humanity. This type of stuff happens so often that I didn&#8217;t even need to go look for an example. I just scrolled X for 10 minutes on the day I wrote this article and happened to </span><a href="https://x.com/zetalyrae/status/2080056964126822536"><span>find one</span></a><span>.</span></figcaption></figure></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h2><span>The state will wake up long before you manage to gain power over it</span></h2><p><span>There is the question of whether it would even be desirable for an AI company to acquire the power to steer or challenge the state. To me it&#8217;s obviously </span><strong><span>EXTREMELY BAD</span></strong><span>: I don&#8217;t trust any AI company CEO with the future of the universe. But that&#8217;s not the point of this post, and I know that the target audience won&#8217;t necessarily agree, so I&#8217;m going to move on.</span></p><p><span>Think concretely about what it would take for an AI company to challenge the state, or even just to prevent the state from taking over its weapon-of-mass-destruction-grade project as soon as the state notices it exists.</span></p><p><span>Presumably the plan is not to set up rogue weapons factories and defeat the state on the physical battlefield. AI companies, to the degree that they are planning to do this, probably have something subtler in mind.</span></p><p><span>For example, near the end of </span><a href="https://ai-2027.com/"><span>AI 2027</span></a><span>, the misaligned ASI performs masterful social engineering on the American people, and on their politicians, to the point where they are completely under its spell. An AI company may plan to do this, while trying to keep the ASI under their control.</span></p><p><span>To get anywhere near those capabilities, AI will almost certainly hit a long list of earlier milestones. Many of those are extremely noticeable to the national security establishment:</span></p><p><strong><span>Really powerful cyber offense and defense.</span></strong><span> Already there. Obviously extremely relevant to the national security establishment, and the state has indeed noticed: the chief of the NSA said that during testing, Claude Mythos &#8220;</span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/anthropics-mythos-model-found-vulnerabilities-classified-us-government-systems-2026-06-24/"><span>broke into almost all of our classified systems, not in weeks, but in hours.</span></a><span>&#8221;</span></p><p><span>Just this week, an </span><a href="https://x.com/OpenAI/status/2079658951264920020?s=20"><span>OpenAI system escaped its sandbox during testing and autonomously hacked into Hugging Face&#8217;s servers</span></a><span>, without ever being instructed to. In response, Congressman Greg Casar</span><a href="https://x.com/RepCasar/status/2079697107607306670?s=20"><span> called for &#8220;international cooperation to keep people safe from absolute disaster&#8221;</span></a><span>.</span></p><p>Today, Congressmen Ted Lieu and Nathaniel Moran introduced an <a href="https://x.com/politico/status/2080213633427214734?s=20">&#8220;AI Kill Switch&#8221; bill</a>, giving the government the power to force shut down of AI systems during loss-of-control events.</p><p><strong><span>Massive capacity for large-scale surveillance and intelligence analysis.</span></strong><span> In order to handle massive tasks, AI has to be able to sort through enormous amounts of information and pull out what matters. Compared to the other tasks ASI will be tackling, the information sorting and analysis that intelligence agencies want is relatively mundane. Long before an AI can manipulate a nation&#8217;s politics, it can read every email in a country and tell you which 10k are the most interesting.</span></p><p><strong><span>Highly autonomous strategic planning for military operations</span></strong><span>. An easy extension of the previous item. Indeed, even Claude Opus has already been used for this in the Iran war, to a limited degree.</span></p><p><strong><span>Partially or fully automated manufacturing.</span></strong><span> Any degree of AI acceleration in manufacturing will clearly catch the eye of the government, both because of its effect on the economy and its usefulness for military purposes.</span></p><p><span>None of these capabilities are subtle; all of them are extremely relevant to national security; and all of them arrive years before anything that could plausibly challenge a state.</span></p><p><span>Even if governments somehow failed to notice on their own, there are people whose entire job is to tell them what&#8217;s coming. I&#8217;m one of them: I work at </span><a href="https://controlai.org/"><span>ControlAI</span></a><span>.<br><br>I can tell you empirically that it&#8217;s not that hard. Policymakers intuitively understand that AI is strategically significant, and they intuitively understand the risks of ASI development. Most of them have simply never had anyone explain it to them in plain terms.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p><h2><span>Once awake, the state will not let you set the terms</span></h2><p><span>I don&#8217;t know whether governments will be fully ASI-pilled, in the sense of internalizing the craziest implications like curing all disease and automating the entire economy.</span></p><p><span>But they don&#8217;t need to be. All that needs to happen is for governments to realize that private companies are developing, and intend to retain full control of, technologies of such strategic value that their owners could start to rival state actors.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png" width="1411" height="1115" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/e2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1115,&quot;width&quot;:1411,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1448680,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://alexamadori.substack.com/i/208173461?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!7x30!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe2e11853-4554-4bec-aed8-3f4c03f250cf_1411x1115.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">What would happen if an AI company tried to performa pivotal act</figcaption></figure></div><p><span>From a political perspective, ASI is much closer to a weapon of mass destruction than to a software product. Once the relevant parts of the executive branch internalize that a private company is building something that could plausibly challenge state authority, or hand a decisive advantage to a foreign adversary if stolen, the question stops being &#8220;how should we regulate this industry&#8221; and becomes &#8220;who controls this project&#8221;. States have a monopoly on violence precisely so that they can win this kind of argument.</span></p><p><span>Even the AI Futures team, who I consider to be more state-aware than most people in AI, makes a version of this mistake. In the </span><a href="https://ai-2027.com/"><span>AI 2027</span></a><span> scenario, once the government gets involved, control of the project is handed to a joint Oversight Committee where the company&#8217;s leadership and investors sit alongside government representatives. The company representatives retain real voting power over what is by then clearly the most strategically important project in American history. Why?</span></p><p><span>At that point in the story, the US government is not yet under the spell of the AI. Nothing is forcing it to share. When the state seizes a weapons of mass destruction program, it does not negotiate a board seat for the previous owners.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a><span> Indeed, private WMD programs </span><em><span>do not exist</span></em><span>, or at least they didn&#8217;t until AI companies started developing ASI.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p><span>What happens </span><em><span>after</span></em><span> the state takes control of all ASI projects is much less clear to me. Development might get halted, transferred entirely to military personnel, or the current companies might keep operating under extremely tight oversight with their leadership reduced to figureheads.</span></p><p><span>What I would like to happen is for the major governments of the world, chiefly the US and China, to enter a regime of mutual monitoring of all AI-relevant compute. This would let us avoid a race to the bottom over who can build ASI in the fastest and most irresponsible way possible. There is no reason to build an AI so powerful it might kill everyone if you can verify that none of the other major players are building one.</span></p><p><span>AI companies cannot make this happen. They could help by consistently and unambiguously calling for it to happen, </span><a href="https://controlai.news/p/anthropic-did-not-call-for-a-pause"><span>instead of gingerly handwaving at it once in a while</span></a><span>. But it is fundamentally not their job to enforce an international regime: they cannot punish defectors, nor can they use force when it becomes necessary. Only states can.</span></p><h2><span>Your </span><s><span>lab</span></s><span> company does not matter as much as you think</span></h2><p><span>Many people in AI have implicitly accepted a picture where the future is determined by what AI companies do.</span></p><p><span>For example, there is the idea that there are &#8220;good companies&#8221; and &#8220;bad companies&#8221;, and talented individuals should join the &#8220;good companies&#8221; to help them win.</span></p><p><span>Under this framing, each company must attempt to be the first to be able to perform a pivotal act. &#8220;Winning&#8221; necessarily means stopping the other companies; otherwise they&#8217;d just release the misaligned ASI further down the line. Stopping the other companies necessarily means doing so by force, stepping into the shoes of the state.</span></p><p><span>States will not let AI companies perform a pivotal act. How could their employees ever think the state would let them perform a pivotal act? San Francisco must be one hell of a drug.</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a></p><p><span>Another idea is about gaining influence: &#8220;I will be in the room, I will have built up credibility, I will steer things when it counts.&#8221; This seems like absolute cope to me, even on its own terms: individual employees have very limited influence over their own company.</span></p><p><span>But that is beside the point: you could be the CEO&#8217;s best friend, and it wouldn&#8217;t matter. The government will take over your ASI project well before ASI.</span></p><p><span>The fundamental mistake is in assuming that companies, rather than states, will decide the rules of the game.</span></p><h2><span>If you want leverage, work on the state</span></h2><p><span>States are where the power is. This is good. We live in a democratic society. This means that we have power over states.</span></p><p><span>No matter how enlightened their leadership, AI companies could never:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Shut down anyone else&#8217;s ASI project.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Sign international agreements.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Enforce an international agreement.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Pressure holdouts to enter an international agreement.</span></p></li></ul><p><span>On the other hand, states can:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Create and enforce international coordination regimes.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Use diplomatic, economic, and if necessary military leverage to bring holdouts into a coordination regime.</span></p></li><li><p><span>Punish defectors from a coordination regime.</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Humanity has exactly one type of institution that can prevent catastrophe, and it&#8217;s not a private company, no matter how good its intentions or its alignment team.</span></p><p><span>I know this conclusion is uncomfortable. Most people in AI are engineers. We</span><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a><span> tend not to like policy. But being good at something useless doesn&#8217;t make it useful. Politics is the process that will determine the outcome of AI development. You can participate in that process or not, but you don&#8217;t get to opt out of its consequences.</span></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>If you want someone to explain it to them in plain terms, you can help us do it by funding us! Here&#8217;s our pitch: </span><a href="https://controlai.org/blog/prevent-asi-plan"><span>Preventing extinction from ASI on a $50M yearly budget</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>The state has strong-armed AI companies over things that had much lower stakes. Recall when </span><a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access"><span>it put export controls on Mythos</span></a><span>, directing Anthropic to suspend access for all foreign nationals.</span></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>It might help to think about it this way: what do you think would happen if Apple launched a nuclear weapons program tomorrow?</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p><span>Not that it would be a good thing, if they let people just go and perform pivotal acts. It is impossible to solve alignment during a race to the bottom on safety, as I wrote about in the post: </span><a href="https://alexamadori.substack.com/p/the-three-filters-why-almost-every"><span>The Three Filters: Why Almost Every Plan to Survive ASI Fails Miserably</span></a></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Believe it or not, I used to be a software engineer and even an AI researcher!</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Three Filters: Why Almost Every Plan to Survive ASI Fails Miserably]]></title><description><![CDATA[War, extinction, or eternal dictatorship: most AI strategies fail in at least one of these ways.]]></description><link>https://thelaststretch.blog/p/the-three-filters-why-almost-every</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://thelaststretch.blog/p/the-three-filters-why-almost-every</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Amadori]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:43:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/27a0a117-b33d-4b78-8882-128691fd2a36_1490x772.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This post is based on my personal views, which mostly overlap with the views of my employer <a href="https://controlai.com/">ControlAI</a> but does not necessarily fully reflect them. This applies in particular, but not exclusively, to technical opinions about AI development and geopolitical predictions.</em></p><p>You might&#8217;ve heard that superintelligent AI (ASI) poses extreme risks like human extinction and other <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_of_astronomical_suffering">comparably undesirable outcomes</a>.</p><p>If you&#8217;re like me, you probably looked into possible solutions. And if so, you may have found a range of reassuringly tractable theories of change. To name a few:</p><ul><li><p>Technical AI safety research agendas</p></li><li><p>Racing to ASI so your favorite company or country can get there first and prevent anyone else from building &#8220;bad&#8221; ASI</p></li><li><p>Building a good ASI and handing it control over the whole world (so that we don&#8217;t have to be subject to any evil human dictators)</p></li></ul><p>If you think about it, all of these feel quite convenient, especially if you&#8217;re a tech-leaning person: you don&#8217;t need to change your career at all. Just keep working on your favorite ASI project, and things will work out.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>It&#8217;s quite easy to come across theories that predict good outcomes without needing to change your strategy at all, even if you&#8217;re actively working to bring about ASI as soon as possible. I see these as being mostly <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/w/semantic-stopsign">semantic stopsigns</a>. Most of them around AI alignment being feasible:</p><ul><li><p>AI alignment is easy and people are working hard on it, so it&#8217;ll probably be ok.</p></li><li><p>AI will help us do alignment research.</p></li><li><p>Iterative deployment will help us catch problems before AI gets too powerful.</p></li></ul><p>In this post, I want to show you that even if the theories of change mentioned above were applied extremely successfully or if AI alignment actually turned out to be technically easy, all the value in the world is still on track to be destroyed because of AI development. This means, mostly, human extinction. It also includes scenarios that don&#8217;t literally qualify as human extinction but are still comparably undesirable. For example, the least-bad scenario I consider in this post is all-out war between nuclear superpowers, and the worst scenarios are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_of_astronomical_suffering">suffering risks (s-risks).</a></p><p>There are many ways in which AI development can destroy the world. In this post I&#8217;ll explain the three most likely pathways. Any plan for survival needs to address all of them and prevent those threats from being realized.</p><p>In my opinion, the only solution that addresses all the potential threats is to achieve two things together:</p><ul><li><p>A level of global coordination sufficient to stop or slow down progress toward ASI, such that all parties can ensure the trajectory of AI development happens according to the consensus and interests of most parties.</p></li><li><p>Mass awareness across society of the implications of ASI and of the worst risks posed by AI development, so the various parties can correctly judge whether allowing development to proceed at a certain pace is in their best interest.</p></li></ul><p>This is why I work at ControlAI, which, at the moment, I believe is the best bet for moving the world closer toward this state. However, in this post I won&#8217;t try very hard to sell my favorite theory of change (<a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TnAR5Sf5hphfnzNTr/usd50-million-a-year-for-a-10-chance-to-ban-asi-1">ControlAI&#8217;s already got a post for that!</a>).</p><p>Rather than arguing for international coordination, I will simply describe how common theories of change that don&#8217;t take this route don&#8217;t prevent the world from being destroyed.</p><h1>Preamble: pressure to cut corners invalidates most theories of change</h1><p>Before explaining the multiple ways in which AI development can destroy the world, I need to introduce this concept as it will come up over and over again. ASI would offer its creator an insurmountable competitive advantage, if it didn&#8217;t kill them. This means there is an extreme pressure to cut corners to be able to reap its benefits as soon as possible.</p><p>This topic has already been explored, so I won&#8217;t go into it too deeply. If you want to see an explanation of why ASI is so powerful, look at &#8220;<a href="https://situational-awareness.ai/">Situational Awareness</a>.&#8221; If you want to see my own game theoretic analysis of an ASI race, read my paper: &#8220;<a href="https://ai-scenarios.com/">Modeling the geopolitics of AI development</a>.&#8221;</p><p>Suffice it to say, a large advantage in AI capabilities would allow its creator, or the rogue AI, to perform an extremely low-cost, low-risk takeover of all other countries and actors in the world. From that point on, they&#8217;d maintain a <a href="https://nickbostrom.com/fut/singleton">singleton</a>: that is, a permanently unassailable total control over the world.</p><p>Once you understand this, it follows that you have to ensure no one else builds an AI capable of overpowering you. Assuming you don&#8217;t have the means to do this, then you have to be the first to gain this insurmountable advantage, before someone else does it and kills you.</p><p>First of all, let&#8217;s step into the shoes of a state actor, or any other powerful actor, and see what actions immediately come to mind after realizing the importance of ASI: &#8220;If any other actor has an ASI project more advanced than mine, I will try to steal, hijack, or otherwise take control of this ASI project.&#8221; Between states, this means espionage and sabotage, including extreme measures up to and including acts of war.</p><p>It also means that skilled actors, such as competent psychopaths or propagandists, will try really hard to gain control over the project. In the case of competent psychopaths, they may manipulate their way into the project&#8217;s leadership.</p><p>This also means that if you are a private company, <strong>there is not a chance in hell you will complete your ASI project and get to keep the ASI </strong>because:</p><ul><li><p>Your government will take over the project!</p></li><li><p>If your government is sufficiently incompetent, other powerful actors (probably an adversary state) will infiltrate your project, steal your technology, and then sabotage you!<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a></p></li></ul><p>For whoever develops an ASI, there will be pressure to establish a singleton as soon as possible, so no one else can ever build an ASI or otherwise topple their regime.</p><p>Finally, race dynamics interact with AI alignment and control: <strong>there is extreme pressure to cut corners to speed up the development and deployment of powerful AI.</strong> At any given moment, deciding to cut corners just a little bit more is locally rational to each actor: the sacrifice probably won&#8217;t make the difference between catastrophe and success, and it gives a competitive advantage.</p><p>Presumably, at some point the perceived risk of catastrophe is so high that the least careful actor is not willing to cut any more corners, and an equilibrium is found. I have no reason to believe this equilibrium settles at a reasonable point! From a state&#8217;s perspective, the counterweight for the pressure to care about AI safety is the pressure to avoid total annihilation at the hands of an adversary.</p><p>&#8212;</p><p><strong>If you take only one thing from this post, take this: </strong><em><strong>any theory of change that falls to one of these competitive pressures is completely useless</strong>.</em><a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> The only way to avoid these pressures is if we could build common knowledge, at any given time, that no one is trying to develop ASI.</p><p>This is why I&#8217;m going for international coordination: while it&#8217;s very difficult, it would address the problem at the source. After that, if someone wants to build ASI, it should be done under an extremely extensive degree of supervision by all parties, such that the other theories of change on how to safely build ASI become much more feasible.</p><p>If you try to address any of the other problems, for example by trying to solve AI alignment and control, before having removed competitive pressures, you are swimming against a strong current and will be swept over the falls.</p><h1>First filter: all-out war between nuclear superpowers</h1><p>I think that hawkish writings about China usually fail to take their reasoning to the logical conclusion. For example, Leopold Aschenbrenner&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="https://situational-awareness.ai/">Situational Awareness</a>&#8221; and Dario Amodei&#8217;s essays, including &#8220;<a href="https://darioamodei.com/post/on-deepseek-and-export-controls">On DeepSeek and Export Controls</a>&#8221; and some of &#8220;<a href="https://darioamodei.com/machines-of-loving-grace">Machines of Loving Grace</a>.&#8221;</p><p>People understand that the US and Chinese governments will wake up to the potential of ASI, and that when they do, absent strong international coordination (which Leopold and Dario assume is absent), the governments will be in an all-out race to who can build it first. The mistake Leopold, Dario and others make is to assume this is a restricted game, where most of what is happening is AI R&amp;D and at most countries will engage in mutual espionage and sabotage.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>If you take these views to their logical conclusion, you would see the ending of this story: all-out war between the US and China. When the superpowers try to sabotage each other&#8217;s ASI projects, they will not stop at grey-zone or covert sabotage. From a state&#8217;s perspective, if your adversary gets ASI, you are <em>done</em>. Your state will stop existing. You might as well have gotten all your major cities vaporized.</p><p>I am very confident that a superpower that knows it&#8217;s about to lose the race, or even considers a high risk of losing, will engage in unambiguous acts of war. The paper &#8220;<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05628">Superintelligence Strategy</a>&#8221; talks about possible kinetic strikes, but I think it will get much worse.</p><p>If states start building very hardened ASI projects, then stopping an opponent&#8217;s progress can be impossible without taking extreme measures that attempt to make the opponent&#8217;s country completely dysfunctional. For example:</p><ul><li><p>Systematically attacking basic infrastructure (like the electrical grid) throughout the opponent&#8217;s territory</p></li><li><p>Sabotaging core functions of the opponent&#8217;s government, such as attempting or strongly supporting a coup</p></li><li><p>Launching an invasion, either to physically stop the ASI projects or to consume all the opponent&#8217;s resources through war</p></li></ul><p>If we get to this point, I don&#8217;t see any reason to be confident that the situation won&#8217;t escalate all the way to a full-blown nuclear war between superpowers.<br><br>I think it would be a fool&#8217;s errand to try to predict the exact reaction of the national security establishment of the losing superpower. It will depend too much on unpredictable and opaque factors, from the structure of the natsec apparatus to whether the people responsible happen to be in a bad mood at some specific, decisive moment.</p><p>But I think it&#8217;s important to note that there are strong mechanisms pushing in the direction of arbitrary escalation, and no strong mechanisms preventing it from doing so.</p><p><strong>And if all-out war between nuclear powers doesn&#8217;t sound bad enough to you, remember this: war would be waged with much more advanced AI than we have today, and the war itself would further shape the incentives around the AI race.</strong></p><h2>Contra &#8220;stable multipolar scenarios&#8221;</h2><p>Stable <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/w/multipolar-scenarios">multipolar scenarios</a> can happen in one of two ways: if AI&#8217;s efficacy at war has reached the limits of physics, or if AIs have a way to enforce a consensus (like in the good ending of &#8220;<a href="https://ai-2027.com/">AI 2027</a>&#8221;).</p><p>AI advantages compound, and if the gap is wide enough, one of the competitors (potentially a rogue AI) wins. It seems unlikely that AI&#8217;s ability to wage war will climb all the way to the limits of physics while the gap between the various actors never gets wide enough to conclude the conflict.</p><p>About AIs enforcing a consensus, roughly, I think this would require AI to already be vastly smarter and more competent than any human or existing human organization. Which makes this proposed &#8220;solution&#8221; kind of tautological: you still need to pass all the filters and build an ASI that you can trust.</p><p>As an example, in &#8220;<a href="https://ai-2027.com/">AI 2027</a>,&#8221; the two ASIs strike a deal by building a &#8220;consensus AI&#8221; that will forever enforce, to some degree, the preferences of both AIs. To do this, you&#8217;d need to have developed an extremely deep fundamental understanding of how to program AI, the kind of understanding that lets you write an AI as lines of code rather than a neural network.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a></p><p>Due to the competitive pressures I talk about in this post, the plan would not unfold this way. Much, much earlier than when you&#8217;d be able to achieve such a deep understanding of AI, you&#8217;d achieve an understanding just barely good enough to build ASI. Then you would build it and thus destroy all value in the world, unless you already figured out a way past all the filters in this post.</p><p>An alternative proposal is to have AIs strike deals that are enforced through mutual monitoring. By the time AIs can strike such deals autonomously, they are already fairly superhuman and / or significantly in charge of running the world, and we need to have passed the filters.</p><p>To be clear, I don&#8217;t necessarily think it&#8217;s a bad idea to have weaker AIs help us enforce monitoring-based international agreements. But this needs to be done before AIs get too strong, at which point humanity would have to do it, even if aided by weaker AIs.</p><p><em>(My paper &#8220;<a href="https://ai-scenarios.com/">Modeling the geopolitics of AI development</a>&#8221; talks about this filter in more detail, but the thinking is less refined since it was written a while ago.)</em></p><h1>Second filter: misaligned AI that kills everyone</h1><p>It is probably very hard to build an ASI that doesn&#8217;t end up killing every human being simply by running it.</p><p>The basic argument is that ASI would be so effective that any failure, even partial, would result in an ASI handling extreme amounts of power while not going out of its way to preserve human life and values.</p><p>ASI would kill us as a side effect of whatever it ends up doing, just like a human destroys an anthill without a second thought when it&#8217;s in the way of a construction project. The field of making sure that ASIs act in a desirable way is called &#8220;AI safety.&#8221;</p><p>The threat model of misaligned AI is the one that has already been explored the most, so I will assume that readers are at least passingly familiar with it and won&#8217;t try to convey the basic idea here. If you need an introduction, read the book &#8220;If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies&#8221; by Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a></p><p>What I want to focus on here is how the pressure to cut corners I mentioned earlier makes it nearly impossible to solve alignment in time for when ASI will be developed. Think of the following competitive pressures:</p><ul><li><p>Pressure to cut corners on safety methods</p></li><li><p>Pressure to deploy as fast as possible</p></li><li><p>Pressure to give AI as much autonomy as possible</p></li><li><p>Pressure to hand over existing decision loops to AI as quickly and thoroughly as possible</p></li></ul><p>So what happens is, AI projects will develop and deploy AI that is as capable as possible given current capabilities techniques, while only being as safe as absolutely necessary to make them usable. The most important part here is: <em>only as safe as absolutely necessary to make them usable</em>. What does it mean? Well, the first instance of this pattern we&#8217;ll discuss is the commercial one.</p><p>Software engineers won&#8217;t use an AI that cheats to make the tests pass <em>every time</em>, but they&#8217;ll use an AI they can usually catch cheating, as long as the violations don&#8217;t fall through the cracks often enough for the engineer to get fired.</p><p>CEOs will not use AI employees that regularly take costly, irreversible actions to the point that the company loses a lot of money or it gets the CEO in trouble. But they will, for example, use AI that takes illegal actions <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/">as long as the company gets fined for less than the money it made</a>, or the crime happens in a third-world country, etc.</p><p>So far it doesn&#8217;t sound like an extinction risk, but what is the &#8220;usability limit&#8221; when it comes to integrating AI in the military? What about tail risks, situations that are too rare and so haven&#8217;t yet appeared in the feedback loop of fixing AI bugs?</p><p><strong>And most importantly, what happens when someone first gets to the capability level where they mostly hand over AI R&amp;D to AIs themselves?</strong></p><p>The AI will be <em>just barely safe enough</em> to profitably (not spotlessly!) do jobs that:</p><ul><li><p>Are roughly as complicated as AI R&amp;D<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a></p></li><li><p>Have short-enough feedback loops that failures have already happened, such that AI companies already have bug tickets for these failures</p></li><li><p>Have already addressed these bug tickets</p></li></ul><p>Of course, you will not be able to get this guarantee for novel tasks, such as AI R&amp;D itself. Probably, you won&#8217;t even be able to get it for tasks that already exist but are not common enough for you to test the AI thoroughly on them during the (very brief) allotted time. You have to hope that whatever safety you have transfers from this small, nonrepresentative set of tasks to the ones that matter.</p><h2>Why Technical AI safety agendas do not address this problem</h2><p>Technical AI safety agendas for addressing extinction risks usually focus on the &#8220;misaligned AI that kills everyone&#8221; filter, so I have to briefly address why, as a general rule, they don&#8217;t work. In fact, they make things worse.</p><p>This is because all alignment work is capabilities work.</p><p>Take RLHF (reinforcement learning from human feedback), for example.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a> RLHF improved &#8220;alignment,&#8221;<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> but it also improved capabilities a lot more: the AIs that we built after RLHF were more liable to do dangerous things than the ones we built before it existed. This is true even if you do your best to use RLHF to make the model safe.</p><p>To the degree that interpretability and scalable oversight work, I confidently predict that they will do exactly the same thing.</p><p><strong>The underlying, fundamental reason for this is that capabilities are easier to formalize than safety.</strong> By this I mean that capabilities are easier to measure and easier to describe to other people, to AIs, and to code without loss of information.</p><p>Imagine that we get an interpretability breakthrough. You would have more readability into the internal algorithms of AIs, but those algorithms are very big and complicated: you wouldn&#8217;t automatically know which parts are helpful and which are harmful.</p><p>Some will be obviously harmful and removed right away. What then? Maybe you can do some manual searches for patterns you suspect exist? But humans are slow. You can get AIs to help you, but AIs are not (yet) smarter than you, and so they&#8217;d miss some stuff. <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WewsByywWNhX9rtwi/current-ais-seem-pretty-misaligned-to-me">Perhaps AIs already have some misaligned biases</a> and so would sometimes actively hinder your efforts.</p><p>On other hand, capabilities, oh how they&#8217;d skyrocket. Better interpretability would yield more powerful methods to modify AIs: it would allow engineers and learning algorithms to modify AIs in more targeted, deliberate, and understandable ways than can be done today.</p><p>Since capabilities are more formalized, you can quickly train a large team of engineers to make use of the novel techniques. Perhaps you can cut engineers out of this loop entirely, integrating the novel technique as part of automated learning algorithms.</p><p>If you want to modify AI to improve a quality that is hard to measure, like safety, you need a human to stand there and opine about each candidate modification. Worse still, the human needs to have good taste about the property you are trying to improve.</p><p>To summarize: capabilities can improve at machine speeds, while safety will always be bottlenecked by humans. The only way to solve this dilemma would be to describe our safety desiderata to the same level that we have described our capabilities desiderata. That way, we could potentially automate AI safety, or at least reliably train a team of engineers to do it. Good luck doing that during an all-out race to ASI!</p><p>I encourage you to think about this issue yourself, especially if you are a researcher at a major AI company working on a technical AI safety agenda. Your work may end up boosting capabilities more than most of the people over on the capabilities teams.</p><h1>Third filter: nightmare singletons</h1><p>Ok, imagine that the alignment problem is on track to get solved, such that a human being (or group of human beings) could operate an ASI without killing themselves and everyone else as a side effect. You and the rest of your team, the &#8220;responsible actors&#8221; in a world composed mostly of irresponsible ones, have the lead in AI development. You will build ASI first and then establish an eternal utopia, right? No.</p><p>Here&#8217;s what really happens: the government takes over your project before you get to ASI, by default as a military project, possibly top secret. You are questioned just enough that they know how to make use of the project&#8217;s assets (like code, documentation, hardware, etc.), and then you are thrown out the door.</p><p>Or maybe a softer version of this happens, where your AI company still technically exists. However, your CEO does not retain effective control of the company, and you have military personnel looking over your shoulder as you work.</p><p>If your government is asleep at the wheel, a foreign government will take over your project, or at least steal all the progress you&#8217;ve made so far and then pour their resources into going faster than you. Or if all governments are asleep at the wheel, another company will take over your project, or perhaps a charming psychopath CEO will manipulate their way into a top leadership position at the company where you work.</p><p>What then?</p><p>Whoever controls an ASI can establish a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singleton_(global_governance)">singleton</a>. A singleton is a &#8220;world order in which there is a single decision-making agency at the highest level, capable of exerting effective control over its domain, and permanently preventing both internal and external threats to its supremacy.&#8221;</p><p>&#8212;</p><p>Let me spell out, for people who haven&#8217;t thought about this subject before, how nightmarish this scenario can get.</p><p>An individual in control of an ASI could establish a dictatorship that controls the entire earth, possibly the entire universe.</p><p>They could monitor every corner of their domain 24/7 and assign a virtually infinite amount of intelligence to analyze all of this information.</p><p>They could compel everyone to install brain implants (or forcibly <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading">upload</a> them, etc.) and have complete oversight and control over their thoughts, actions, and experiences.</p><p>Eventually, they could shape the whole world to their preference until every atom is exactly as they want it, and do it as easily as a child shapes playdough.</p><p>&#8212;</p><p>In AI safety, some people&#8217;s strategy is to give power and resources to &#8220;good&#8221; or &#8220;responsible&#8221; actors, such as their favorite AI company.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-9" href="#footnote-9" target="_self">9</a> The theory of change for this strategy is that the &#8220;responsible&#8221; actor is the first to build ASI and establishes a utopian (or at least &#8220;good&#8221;) singleton.</p><p>I think that it is an enormous mistake to trust any one person or company with this. If your strategy is to use ASI to establish a &#8220;good&#8221; singleton, I will fight to prevent you from succeeding because I don&#8217;t trust you. But regardless, I hope this post makes you see that this strategy will break horribly.</p><p>If you are part of an ASI project and this is your plan, know this: someone more powerful than you will take your toys away before you get to ASI. Then, they will use them to race to ASI without you.</p><p>What happens later is fundamentally unpredictable. The result does not have to be as bad as the nightmare scenario I painted earlier. But from where we&#8217;re standing, it could easily get really bad.</p><p>I think what happens if any individual or small group of people obtains absolute power over the universe is an extremely dystopian scenario, potentially worse than death depending on your values. I think the same is true for scenarios in which we just barely make enough progress on alignment that ASI doesn&#8217;t kill us all as a side effect. ASI may want a future for us, but it could be a future that we find abhorrent, and it would have absolute power over us.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-10" href="#footnote-10" target="_self">10</a></p><p>Even in the best case scenario, where the ASI project is taken over by a government with a very robust democratic process, the situation would most likely be considered a national security emergency. Such emergencies are dealt with by the military (or more generally, the executive branch), which needs to be able to act quickly. As a result, it has weaker democratic oversight compared to other government branches.</p><p>What will this government do after having declared an emergency situation, armed with proto-ASI? Would you feel safe if you thought your government was bound to establish a singleton?</p><h1>How common theories of change fail trivially</h1><p>Any solution or theory that focuses entirely on technical AI safety fails trivially by not taking into account the two other filters. For example, some people think AI alignment will be easy to solve. I think this view is most likely mistaken on a very deep level. But even if it were correct, it would not address the other two problems at all.</p><p>Furthermore, I think that all technical AI safety projects will not be successful, not in a world where actors are able to unilaterally push the frontier of AI development toward ASI. This is due to the pressure to cut corners on safety, and because any technique will accelerate capabilities much more than it accelerates progress in AI safety.</p><p>The philosophy of &#8220;iterative deployment&#8221; will simply not apply in a world where the pace of deployment depends entirely on competitive pressure and is entirely causally disconnected from any consideration of what may be a &#8220;responsible&#8221; pace for AI development.</p><p>There are some who try to acquire personal power or influence so they can exert it &#8220;when the time comes.&#8221; This can mean attaining influence inside of AI companies or in governments. As I pointed to in the third filter, I think power within AI companies is meaningless.</p><p>And I think the people who try to acquire unilateral power within governments are deeply misguided. When push comes to shove, they will fail at gaining enough power to steer the actions of governments.</p><p>If the majority of the government does not understand the meaning of ASI, these people will not be able to make massively expensive and complex asks to leadership. For example: &#8220;slow down AI development to improve safety&#8221; or &#8220;pressure other major powers to enter a hefty trust but verify regimes capable of providing mutual assurances on AI development.&#8221; If these people try to push these asks without first building a broad support base (probably as broad as a decent voting bloc), then they will simply get purged.</p><p>Finally, there are people trying to get a major power to engage in a race to ASI, beat all their adversaries to it, and establish a singleton. I think these theories of change fail on literally all three filters:</p><ul><li><p>The world will likely be consumed by war before any actor can get to ASI.</p></li><li><p>Even if we narrowly avoid all-out war, this theory of change leads to a race to the bottom on AI safety and to uncontrollable ASI that kills everyone.</p></li><li><p>Even if the ASI ends up being somewhat controllable, no country on Earth currently has such institutional robustness that it would not produce a dystopia if it acquired ASI.</p></li></ul><h1>Conclusion</h1><p>These were the main three challenges that I think stand between us and surviving ASI. Even if we pass all three, I don&#8217;t think things automatically go well.</p><p>I have more <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition_pump">intuition pumps</a> that I would like to publish in a future post. They are mostly about how, in scenarios with AI that is strong but not as strong as I&#8217;ve been implying ASI is, that:</p><ul><li><p>There is a strong tendency for power to concentrate and for the world to gravitate toward the three outcomes I&#8217;ve been describing.</p></li><li><p>There is a tendency for human preferences and behavior to mutate beyond recognition, to a degree that we might think of such people as essentially &#8220;dead.&#8221;</p></li></ul><p>The main way that I envision humanity passing these filters is with deep awareness of what ASI entails and with international coordination.</p><p>Deep awareness is necessary so the relevant parties understand what their interests are with respect to ASI. Chiefly, they need to understand that ASI can become powerful enough to destroy the world, and that it is indeed extremely hard to deploy an ASI without destroying the world.</p><p>Coordination, backed by mutual monitoring and deterrence, is necessary so the major parties can avoid a race to the bottom over who builds ASI first. Without it, they will end up developing and deploying ASI in the most irresponsible way possible, and thus destroy the world.</p><p><strong>Both deep awareness and coordination are necessary so countries can eventually get to work to figure out how to go through this transition while avoiding the horrific failure modes I&#8217;ve described, and others yet.</strong></p><p>At the moment, my best bet for achieving these goals is to work at ControlAI. If you&#8217;re interested in learning more about ControlAI, feel free to read our <a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TnAR5Sf5hphfnzNTr/preventing-extinction-from-asi-on-a-usd50m-yearly-budget">funding pitch</a>, which also goes in detail about ControlAI&#8217;s theory of change. Alternatively, feel free to shoot me a message.</p><p><em><a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/BWNqdt5edJdax4jn8/the-three-filters-why-almost-every-plan-to-survive-asi-fails">This post is also on LessWrong.</a></em><br></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://thelaststretch.blog/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Subscribe for free for more posts on AI and other things pivotal to the future.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>This includes things like stealing your weights and then sabotaging your ASI projects, but also trying to insert backdoors into your AI systems.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>And worse than useless if you consider that it absorbs funds and attention.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Even when they acknowledge the possibility of war, it is treated as something that happens in the very endgame. Countries are not treated as being able to look ahead and strike preemptively.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Even with such an understanding, code may not be the optimal way to build an AI, and you may choose to use neural networks or a new technique altogether. The point is <em>if you wanted to write it in code, you could.</em></p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Some people criticize Yudkowsky and Soares&#8217; arguments for not engaging properly with the peculiarities of LLMs and claim that LLMs make alignment easier. I have it on my to-do list to write about why the shape of current AI systems doesn&#8217;t make me particularly optimistic about alignment. Unfortunately, at the moment I don&#8217;t know of a good post to convey this; the best one I can point you to is: &#8220;<a href="https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WewsByywWNhX9rtwi/current-ais-seem-pretty-misaligned-to-me">Current AIs seem pretty misaligned to me</a>.&#8221;</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>In fact, I think this is quite optimistic. AI companies are prioritizing AI R&amp;D over anything else, so it will be one of the first (if not <em>the</em> first) task AIs will be able to perform at its level of complexity. There will not have been trial runs with similarly complex tasks.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>RLHF is the technique that enabled the creation of the first version of ChatGPT.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Insofar as you could get LLMs to actually do the task you asked them to do, even when the task was not extremely simple and even if you weren&#8217;t an expert base-model prompter.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-9" href="#footnote-anchor-9" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">9</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>This includes technical people who decide to work on capabilities at an AI company.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-10" href="#footnote-anchor-10" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">10</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>The bad ending of &#8220;<a href="https://ai-2027.com/">AI 2027</a>&#8221; falls under this last category, and it was considered the most likely ending by the authors at the time of writing.)</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>